Ultimatum salary bargaining with real effort by García-Gallego, Aurora et al.
Ultimatum salary bargaining with real 
effort 
Article 
Accepted Version 
García­Gallego, A., Georgantzis, N. and Jaramillo­Gutiérrez, 
A. (2008) Ultimatum salary bargaining with real effort. 
Economics Letters, 98 (1). pp. 78­83. ISSN 01651765 doi: 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2007.04.009 Available at 
http://centaur.reading.ac.uk/34780/ 
It is advisable to refer to the publisher’s version if you intend to cite from the 
work. 
Published version at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2007.04.009 
To link to this article DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2007.04.009 
Publisher: Elsevier 
All outputs in CentAUR are protected by Intellectual Property Rights law, 
including copyright law. Copyright and IPR is retained by the creators or other 
copyright holders. Terms and conditions for use of this material are defined in 
the End User Agreement . 
www.reading.ac.uk/centaur 
CentAUR 
Central Archive at the University of Reading 
Reading’s research outputs online
Ultimatum Salary Bargaining with Real Effort
Aurora Garc´ıa-Gallego
Nikolaos Georgantz´ıs∗
LEE/LINEEX and Economics Department, Universitat Jaume I
Ainhoa Jaramillo-Gutie´rrez
LEE and Economics Department, Universitat Jaume I
Abstract
We report experimental results on ultimatum salary bargaining with a real
task performed by employee subjects. Compared to the baseline treatment with
a hypothetical task, the introduction of a real task raises offers, accepted wages
and rejection rates.
JEL Classification: J30, C91
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I Introduction
A well-known theoretical and experimental framework in which fairness and bargain-
ing have been analyzed by economists is that of ultimatum games. In an ultimatum
game, two players bargain over a pie of size Y in the following way: The first player
(leader) offers a share X ∈ [0, Y ] to the second (follower) one, keeping Y − X for
himself. The second player has to decide whether to accept or reject the offer. If
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the offer is accepted, the proposed shares are gained by the players. Otherwise,
they both earn nothing. Since the seminal article by Gu¨th et al. (1982), the game
has inspired a vast literature. Bearden’s (2001) exhaustive review indicates that
results are sensitive to a number of factors. Typical findings include systematic
deviations from the subgame perfect equilibrium prediction of minimum offers by
leaders and global acceptance by followers. Instead, a fairer split of 60%-40% is the
most frequently observed outcome.
An implicit assumption underlying ultimatum bargaining is that both parties’
involvement is needed for the pie to be earned, first, and then divided. The most
obvious real world example of such asymmetric negotiations can be found in salary
formation resulting from employee-employer interaction. However, bargaining be-
tween employers and employees never occurs over “found money”. If an employer
had full control of the pie, why would he need a second agent with whom to share his
own property? In the real world, firms can be seen as the result of combining com-
plementary assets like, for example, labor and capital. Salaries offered by employers
and accepted by employees should reflect each party’s involvement in the common
enterprize. Following standard economic theory, raising one’s cost of participating
in a partnership should increase his pursued and actual share of the resulting profit.
In this paper, we test this hypothesis. First, we frame ultimatum bargaining as a
situation of salary negotiation. Second, we introduce a real task which has to be
performed by employee-subjects as a consequence of accepting a given salary. We
show that real effort raises salaries. In fact, this result is due to both higher salary
offers by employers and higher rejection rates by employees.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the experimental design.
In section III we discuss the results. Section IV concludes.
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II Experimental design
The experiments reported here were run as a part of a more general, ongoing project
investigating several labor market-related phenomena like unemployment, contract
security, cultural and gender differences, etc. All sessions were run in the Laboratori
d’Economia Experimental (LEE) at Castello´n, Spain. Forty subjects were recruited
among Business Administration students. They were randomly assigned to one of
the two treatments labelled hereafter as HT (Hypothetical Task) and RT (Real
Task). At the beginning of each session, subjects were randomly assigned the role
of an employee or an employer. Each subject’s role was kept fixed along the whole
session. To avoid end-game effects, sessions were randomly stopped between the
30th and the 35th period. In each period, subjects were randomly matched to form
employer-employee pairs. In order to avoid undesirable session effects, subjects in
each session were divided into two groups between which no matching took place.1
At the beginning of each session, written instructions2 were given to the subjects
followed by oral explanation and answers to any remaining doubts. The experiment
was framed as a situation in which an employer offers his/her employee x ∈ [0, 10]
Euro in steps of .10. Acceptance by an employee in HT implies that the 10e profit
is raised by the firm and divided as proposed by the employer. Apart from profit
raising and sharing as defined in HT, acceptance by an employee-subject in RT
implies accepting to perform a unit of a real task: filling each one of 20 numbered
envelops with their corresponding single-page letters. The envelop-filling sub-session
was organized in a separate room next to the computer lab. Payment and, when
applicable, task performing obligations, were determined as the sum of earnings
and task units agreed over 5 periods which were randomly chosen by the computer.
Apart from their earnings in the experiment, subjects received a 5e show-up fee
1Differences across groups were found not to be statistically significant and data reported here
are the result of aggregation within each treatment.
2Available upon request.
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which was used to mitigate the relative magnitude of the difference in earnings
across player types. Average earnings were approximately 25e. The computerized3
salary-negotiation sub-session (HT and RT) lasted an average of one hour. The
duration of the task-performing sub-session (RT only) never exceeded 30 minutes,
but significantly varied across subjects, depending critically on the number of task
units performed.
III Results
For the sake of comparability, we have analyzed the same number of observations
per treatment. Thus, we focus on the analysis of data obtained from the first 33
periods of each session. This implies 330 observations for each type of player. We
summarize here our main findings.
Tables 1 and 2 present descriptive statistics on offers, salaries and rejections. A
first finding concerns the resemblance of our HT treatment to standard ultimatum
game experiments. Both salary offers and accepted salaries are not significantly
different from 4. This means that in the absence of a real task, our experiments
reproduce the results usually obtained in the standard (abstract) ultimatum game.
We summarize this in the following result.
Result 1: The “labor-market” label of ultimatum bargaining yields the standard
60%-40% split of earnings.
Both the median (4 vs. 4.5) and the average (3.96 vs. 4.09) of salary offers
posted by employers are lower when employees are faced with a fictitious task than
when they have to perform a real one. The difference is statistically significant as
reflected by the result of a Mann-Whitney test (p=0.000).
[Table 1 about here]
3Programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 1999).
4
In Table 2, the first column under each treatment’s heading presents the number
of salary offers per 1/2e interval. Approximately 86% of all salary offers (284/330)
collected under treatment HT concentrate on a single peak between 3.7 and 4.2e.
The distribution of salary offers collected under the RT treatment exhibit two peaks.
One of them is observed on the 3.7-4.2 interval, corresponding to 30% (100/330) of
all salary offers. Another 40% (127/330) of the observed salary offers correspond
to the interval between 4.7 and 5.2e. Finally, 50 observations correspond to salary
offers between these two modes. These differences in the distribution of salaries
across treatments give further support to the finding that salary offers are higher in
RT than in HT.
[Table 2 about here]
Apart from the distribution of salary offers, table 2 can be used to study dif-
ferences in employees’ behavior expressed in terms of rejection rates. Under each
treatment’s heading, the second and third columns present, respectively, rejections
in absolute numbers and as a percentage of offers. Salary offers below 3.2e are
rejected in almost all cases under both treatments (except for 4/38 offers in RT).
We focus on offers above 3.2e. In both treatments, rejection rates decrease as salary
offers increase. However, the percentage of rejections in each salary offer interval is
higher under the RT treatment. This result receives significant support if we com-
pare across treatments rejection rates for salary offers in the 3.7-4.2 interval (13%
in HT vs. 42% in RT).
Below, we summarize these findings.
Result 2: Employers make higher salary offers when employees have to perform
the real task.
Result 3: A given salary offer is more frequently rejected by employees in the
real task treatment.
Going back to table 1, we observe that salaries are higher in RT than in HT.
5
This is true for both the median (4 vs. 4.70) and the mean (4 vs. 4.55), and the
difference is significant as indicated by a Mann-Whitney test (p=0.000). This result
is stated below.
Result 4: Higher salaries (accepted offers) are observed when employees have
to perform the real task.
Figure 1 presents histograms which help us visualize the results discussed so far.
It can also be observed that both salary offers and actual salaries (accepted offers)
present a higher dispersion in RT than in HT, as can be also confirmed by the
standard deviations reported in table 1. This secondary finding may suggest that
the existence of a real task increases the heterogeneity in employers’ perception of
their employees’ participation costs.
[Figure 1 about here]
The percentage of successful contracts over the number of employee-employer
matchings is used as an indicator of efficiency in ultimatum bargaining. However,
in our experiment, the costs and benefits of the real task should also be taken
into account. Unfortunately, the realism-enhancing device of the real task makes it
impossible to rigorously compare the two treatments in terms of efficiency, since the
costs of performing the task are unknown. Instead, we concentrate on employment
rates, measured as the percentage of accepted salary offers. From simple inspection
of total rejection percentages (17% in HT vs. 33% in RT) provided under the third
heading of table 1, we reach the following result.
Result 5: Overall employment is lower when employees have to perform a real
task.
IV Conclusions
We study salary formation as the result of ultimatum bargaining. Our main result
can be stated in two steps. First, in comparison with standard ultimatum bargaining
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experiments, our baseline treatment, framed as a labor market with a hypothetical
task, reproduces the usual 60%-40% “split of the pie”. Second, when employee-
subjects are asked to perform a real task, the resulting salaries are significantly higher
than in the standard no-real-effort setting. Following the resemblance between our
baseline treatment and previous abstract (non-labor framed) ultimatum games, the
reported salary differences are unambiguously associated with employees’ real effort.
Furthermore, we show that the effect of real effort on observed salaries is due to
differences in both employer- and employee-subjects’ behavior. Specifically, in the
real-effort treatment, employers post higher salary offers and employees are more
likely to reject.
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Offers Salaries Rejections
Treatment HT
N 330 275 55
Median 4.00 4.00
Mean 3.96 4.00 17%
Std. Dev. 0.21 0.16
Treatment RT
N 330 222 108
Median 4.50 4.70
Mean 4.09 4.55 33%
Std. Dev. 1.30 0.80
Table 1: Descriptive statistics by treatment.
8
Treatment HT Treatment RT
Offer (x) N % Rej. C.D. N % Rej. C.D.
0.7 > x 0 0 0 17 88 15
0.7 ≤ x < 1.2 0 0 0 15 87 28
1.2 ≤ x < 1.7 0 0 0 0 0 28
1.7 ≤ x < 2.2 0 0 0 1 100 29
2.2 ≤ x < 2.7 0 0 0 3 100 32
2.7 ≤ x < 3.2 3 100 3 2 100 34
3.2 ≤ x < 3.7 25 64 19 9 90 42
3.7 ≤ x < 4.2 284 13 55 100 42 84
4.2 ≤ x < 4.7 17 0 55 50 24 96
4.7 ≤ x < 5.2 1 0 55 127 9 107
5.2 ≤ x < 5.7 0 0 55 2 50 108
5.7 ≤ x 0 0 55 4 0 108
Table 2: Number (N) of offers and percentage of rejections within each offer interval.
C.D. refers to the Cumulative Distribution of the number of rejections.
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